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Abstract
Do foreign banks perform better than domestic banks in host developing economies?
Relying on financial statements and survey data I compare the performance of
three different categories of foreign banks to the group of domestic banks in sub-
Saharan Africa: global banks from developed countries, regional African banks
and banks from non-African emerging economies. While emerging-market banks
and global banks consistently outperform domestic banks, the difference is not
significant for regional African banks. The higher performance of global banks
and emerging-market banks is related to higher operational efficiency and lower
cost of funding, while there is no strong evidence of segmentation by business
segment in the loans market. Regional African banks, which started their foreign
expansion more recently, are less able to generate interest income compared to
domestic banks. These findings highlight the importance of taking into account
foreign banks’ heterogeneity when assessing the impact of financial FDI on the
host economy.
JEL classification: F21; F23; G21
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1. Introduction
As foreign banks’ presence has increased sharply over the last two decades the question
of the performance and financial strength of these banks, as well as the allocation of
their loan portfolios, has become particularly relevant, especially in developing countries
where capital markets are under-developed and SMEs face high financing constraints.
While there is ample literature on the performance of foreign banks the results have been
ambiguous, partly due to limited data coverage and the treatment of these banks as a
homogeneous group. A recent stream of research (Van Horen, 2007; Claessens and Van
Horen, 2012, 2013, 2014; Claessens, 2017) has started to examine the issue of foreign
banks’ entry with a more fine-grained approach by looking at the origins of foreign banks
operating in developing countries. It has found that the impact of foreign banks on
the host economy depends in part on these banks’ home countries and business models,
and on the specific characteristics of their host countries. Factors such as geographic and
cultural distance, as well as the host country’s level of financial development and strength
of regulation, have been shown to be of particular importance for explaining foreign banks’
performance and their impact on the local supply of credit. While these first empirical
studies are important, in that they offer glimpses into the locational determinants and
performance of foreign banks in developing countries, they do not adequately address
the question of the cause of the performance differences observed between foreign banks
from developing countries and those from developed countries. Neither do they examine
the related questions of the business strategies, in terms of lending and funding, of these
banks when they enter foreign markets. This present research aims to do so by adopting
a regional lens.
More specifically, this paper aims to determine the factors that drive the differences in
performance between different groups of foreign banks and domestic banks, focusing on
sub-Saharan Africa, the developing region with the largest proportion of foreign-owned
banks in terms of numbers1.
Little is known about banking in sub-Saharan Africa despite the fact that the fi-
nancial sector is an important recipient of FDI in the region, representing 22% of total
cross-border M&A purchases in the region in 2013 (UNCTAD, 2015:33) and 7% of total
greenfield FDI projects in 2011 (UNCTAD, 2012:40). This has been in part driven by
intra-Africa FDI, with financial services accounting for about 50% of intra-Africa green-
field investment projects between 2003 and the start of 2014, 38% of these projects being
in retail banking and 5% in insurance (UNCTAD, 2015:38). While global banks are still
1In 2009 52% of banks in sub-Saharan Africa were foreign banks (from 31% in 1995), while this
percentage was only 24% in East Asia and the Pacific (from 18% in 1995), 13% in South Asia (from
7% in 1995), and 42% in Latin America and the Caribbean (from 28% in 1995). The proportion of
foreign-owned banks was also high in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, at 47% in 2009, against 15% in
1995 (Claessens and Van Horen, 2013, 2014).
1
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
very important players in the region the emergence of regional African banks, with a clear
pan-African ambition, has modified the banking landscape. Some regional African banks
enjoy a significant presence in a large number of countries, such as Ecobank Transnational
(from Togo), which has operations in thirty countries in West Africa, Central Africa and
East Africa. The larger banking groups in South Africa, such as Standard Bank, have
also started to invest outside the region, setting up branches or subsidiaries in developed
countries and in other emerging countries. As a result, several types of foreign banks now
co-exist with domestic banks in sub-Saharan African markets: foreign affiliates of global
multinational banks from developed countries (France and the U.K. in particular), foreign
affiliates of emerging-market banks from Asia or the Middle East, and foreign affiliates
of regional African banks. To compare the financial performance of these different cate-
gories of banks I use panel data from the Bureau van Dijk’s BankScope database to obtain
financial information on banks located in sub-Saharan Africa over the 2003-2012 period.
I then exploit data from a novel bank survey of 77 banks in 14 sub-Saharan African
countries conducted in 2013-2014 to triangulate information and further explain some
of the findings obtained from the financial statements. I find that the foreign affiliates
of global banks and emerging-market banks perform significantly better than domestic
banks in sub-Saharan Africa, with a return on equity (using profit before tax) on average
7 basis-points higher over the study period for global banks and 28 basis-points higher for
emerging-market banks, while the difference in performance is not significant for regional
African banks.
Overall, this research suggests that the higher performance of foreign global banks
and emerging-market banks relative to domestic banks is more driven by different access
to funding (liability side of the balance sheet) and operating efficiencies than by different
abilities to generate interest income (asset side). However, with regard to the more
recently expanding regional African banks, the results suggest that they have a lower
ability than domestic banks to generate interest income. This may be related to the fact
that they still need to establish themselves and gain new customers. In contrast, the two
other groups of foreign banks can benefit from better known brands (global banks such
as Barclays or Standard Chartered) or an older presence on the continent with significant
experience in financing specific population groups (Indian banks for instance).
In addition, the findings from the survey suggest that global banks receive more
operational support from their headquarters in the domains of IT, risk management
techniques and lending technology compared to the two other groups of foreign banks, as
their operations tend to be more centralised at the global or regional headquarters’ level.
This higher level of operational support may partly explain the lower cost-to-income ratios
observed when compared to regional African banks. To the extent that the heterogeneity
among foreign banks with regard to business models, organizational structure and lending
techniques translates into differences in performance and asset-liability management, this
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needs to be taken into account by policymakers when formulating banking regulations
and FDI policies.
This paper offers three contributions to the international banking literature.
First, it offers a comparison of the performance and loan allocations of different cate-
gories of foreign banks. Empirical research on the banking sector in developing countries
has mainly focused on the impact of foreign banks from developed countries on SME
financing in host developing countries (Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria and Sanchez, 2005;
Detragiache, Tressel and Gupta, 2008; Giannetti and Ongena, 2009). Very few studies
have compared the performance of different types of foreign banks as these have tradition-
ally been examined as a homogeneous group without distinguishing between developing
and developed MNEs. However, this comparison matters as the strategies and perfor-
mance of foreign banks have implications for the development of host banking markets,
and both elements may differ between developing and developed foreign banks. Recently,
economists such as Van Horen (2007) and Claessens and Van Horen (2012, 2014) have
used a new, comprehensive database on bank ownership across the world to examine the
issue of foreign banks’ entry in a more refined manner by looking at the origins of foreign
banks operating in developing countries. For instance, Van Horen (2007) has found that
banks from developing countries are more likely to invest in other developing countries
with weak institutions, and that developing countries’ foreign banks are less profitable
than foreign banks from high-income countries in host developing countries, based on
measures of profit before tax divided by total assets over the 2000-2004 period. The
findings of this present work are also similar to those of Claessens and van Horen (2012),
who use data from a large number of developing countries over the 1999-2006 period and
find that foreign banks tend to perform better when they are from a high-income country,
when they are larger and when they have a bigger market share. This work complements
the research of Claessens and van Horen (2012) by focusing on a specific developing re-
gion, sub-Saharan Africa, and providing a detailed examination of the drivers of bank
performance, including detailed loan portfolio data and information on organizational
structure and headquarters-subsidiaries relationships. In addition, by separating foreign
banks from developing countries into two categories, those that are regional and those
that come from developing or emerging countries outside the host region, this research
uncovers a high heterogeneity, in terms of both performance and business model, between
these two groups.
Second, this research presents new survey data on banks’ practices and organization,
which is commonly very scarce, in particular in Africa. For instance, Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-
Kunt and Mart´ınez Per´ıa (2011) conducted a World Bank survey on banks’ SME lending
practices in 2007 which covered 91 banks from 45 countries around the world but included
only 15 sub-Saharan African banks from 7 countries. Focusing on bank lending to SMEs
they find that foreign banks rely more on hard verifiable information for lending decisions,
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and that they are more likely to use real estate as collateral. At the same time, the authors
do not find that foreign banks lend less to SMEs than private domestic banks. Another
survey of SME financing in four East African countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and
Zambia), conducted by the African Development Bank in 2012 (see Calice, Chando and
Sekioua, 2012), is based on interviews at 16 different banks. The authors find that in
East Africa banks consider the SME segment to be profitable but they also highlight a
number of obstacles to SME lending, including business regulations and the difficulty of
standardizing risk models, products and procedures in this segment.
The BEPS banking survey2, jointly undertaken by the EBRD and Tilburg Univer-
sity, resulted in a sample of 611 banks in 32 transition countries (including three North
African countries) at two points in time: 2007 and 2010. Several papers have relied on
the BEPS survey to examine various aspects of lending. For instance, Haselmann and
Wachtel (2007), in the context of transition countries, find that although banks differ in
their levels of risk exposure, with foreign, EU and large banks showing a lower probability
of default compared to their competitors, overall, no group of banks is subject to excessive
risk taking. In a following work Haselmann and Wachtel (2010) find that in transition
economies the banks’ loan portfolio composition depends on the legal environment. Banks
lend relatively more to SMEs and lend more mortgages in a well-functioning environment,
while in a bad legal environment the proportion of lending to large enterprises, govern-
ment and other household lending is higher. Finally, De Haas, Ferreira and Taci (2010)
also find that the regulatory environment, in particular legal creditor protection, is an
important determinant of the composition of banks’ loan portfolios. They also find that
bank factors such as ownership and size matter. Foreign banks are strongly involved in
mortgage lending, demonstrating their willingness and ability to lend to local customers.
On the corporate side size matters, with small banks lending relatively more to SMEs
than large banks, which focus more on large firms. Overall, these different surveys, con-
ducted in very different environments, seem to suggest that foreign banks are willing and
able to lend to the local SME segment but that the strength of the legal environment
matters. This new dataset provides richer information on banks in Africa, not only on
lending techniques but also on the interaction between headquarters and their African
subsidiaries, shedding light on the mechanisms behind the observed performance of banks.
Third, this research provides a first analysis of the performance of foreign multinational
banks in sub-Saharan Africa. So far the literature on banking in sub-Saharan Africa has
been very limited, despite the rapid evolution and recent dynamism of the banking sector
in the region. Studies have often focused on a specific country, such as Uganda (Beck
and Hesse, 2009), Kenya (Beck and Fuchs, 2004) or Nigeria (Beck, Cull and Jerome,
2http://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/economics/data/banking-environment-and-performance-survey.
html
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2005), or on the demand side of the banking market in sub-Saharan Africa, especially
through the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys. This research offers a regional perspec-
tive on the performance of banks which have a presence across the continent. Finally,
given the potential impact of foreign banks on host countries’ stability via the internal
capital markets that these multinational banks operate (see the literature on internal
bank funding, for instance, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012), De Haas and Van Lelyveld
(2010), Popov and Udell (2012)), understanding how the funding model (liabilities) and
the lending portfolio (assets) differ across different groups of banks is key to enhancing
policy recommendations related to foreign bank entry.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature
and theoretical predictions. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 compares the prof-
itability and cost-efficiency of the different categories of banks. In Section 5 I further
examine the channels of bank performance by decomposing the profit measure into its
accounting components. Section 6 investigates an alternative explanation for performance
difference, namely whether banks’ performance is driven by composition effects related to
segmentation in the loan market. Finally, Section 7 discusses the results and concludes.
2. Related literature and theoretical predictions
In this section the literature is briefly reviewed to examine the relative advantages of
being a foreign bank. Four different types of factors that can affect foreign banks’ perfor-
mance are traditionally highlighted in the literature: host country characteristics, home
country characteristics, distance and bank characteristics (see, for instance, Claessens and
van Horen, 2012). I derive hypotheses below regarding how each factor affects the differ-
ent categories of banks (domestic banks and foreign affiliates of global banks, emerging-
market banks and African banks).
2.1. Host country factors
Starting with host country characteristics, foreign banks are found to be especially
profitable in developing countries (Claessens and van Horen, 2012), and more generally
in countries where credit information is limited and contract enforcement is low. In those
countries where regulation is weak and the banking sector is inefficient foreign banks might
be better able to gain market share and be profitable. However, research has shown that
it is foreign banks from high-income countries that tend to perform better, suggesting
that access to capital and technological and lending know-how matters (Claessens, 2017).
Hypothesis 1 The foreign affiliates of global banks from developed countries
perform better than domestic banks in sub-Saharan Africa.
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2.2. Home country factors
The overall development of the home market matters for bank performance. Indeed,
in developed countries with well-developed regulatory systems and an educated labour
force, banks will be better able to develop their risk management techniques, and adopt
new financial instruments and technologies (see Berger et al., 2000). This will lead them
to undertake high-return projects. The degree of competition also matters. Banks from
countries where banking markets are competitive are more likely to be more efficient
and more innovative (Aghion and Howitt, 1998). As such they might be better able
to be competitive abroad. Given that the banking markets in the home countries of
global banks tend to be competitive and sophisticated, we can expect them to be more
operationally efficient than foreign banks from African countries.
Hypothesis 2 The foreign affiliates of global banks exhibit higher operational
efficiency than the foreign affiliates of African banks in sub-
Saharan Africa.
2.3. Distance factor
Distance between home and host country also matters. In a relationship-based ac-
tivity such as banking knowledge of the local environment is crucial in order to screen
and effectively monitor borrowers (Freixas and Rochet, 1997; Berger, Klapper and Udell,
2001), especially, as is the case for Africa, in low-transparency economies with a large
informal sector and limited or non-existent formal documentation (Beck, Maimbo, Faye
and Triki, 2011). As a consequence, in this sector the advantages conferred by local ex-
perience may be particularly salient. Indeed, both theoretical (Hauswald and Marquez,
2006) and empirical (Berger and DeYoung, 2001, 2006; Mian, 2006; Claessens and Van
Horen, 2014) studies have suggested that foreign banks that are closer to the host coun-
try are better able to process soft information and therefore to provide loans to local
firms. For instance, Stein (2002) theoretically shows that greater distance decreases bank
managers’ incentives to acquire “soft” information on projects as it cannot be credibly
transmitted. Closeness eases the collection of soft information and its internal transmis-
sion. This would suggest that domestic banks would be better able to work with soft
information, and would be expected to perform better than foreign banks in segments
where soft information and local knowledge are key, such as SME lending.
In addition, this would suggest that the foreign affiliates of regional African banks
may also have an important information advantage when operating in their home region
compared to global banks from developed countries which may struggle to assess and
monitor relatively opaque businesses. This is reflected in the “institutional voids’ ad-
vantage” hypothesis (Khanna and Palepu, 2006, 2010), according to which MNEs from
developing countries undertaking South-South FDI3 have an adaptation advantage over
3From a developing or emerging country to another developing or emerging country.
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MNEs from developed countries undertaking North-South FDI4. This advantage comes
from their ability to deal with difficult institutional environments, characterized by “in-
stitutional voids”. These voids are defined by Khanna and Palepu (2006) as the absence
of specialized intermediaries, regulatory systems and contract-enforcing mechanisms, and
the ability to deal with them is developed in their home (emerging or developing) coun-
try. In addition to an institutional voids advantage related to specific managerial abilities
MNEs from developing countries operating in other developing countries could also ben-
efit from an advantage related to the similarity of the demand (determined by per capita
income levels) between their home and host countries5. This should make them better
able to offer products that are well-adapted to the characteristics of the demand in their
host countries.6 Due to their closeness to their host markets the sectoral allocation of
loans and the lending technology used by the foreign affiliates of African banks should
be similar to those of domestic banks in host sub-Saharan African countries. This means
that they should operate in ways similar to local banks, which leads to the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 The foreign affiliates of African banks exhibit levels of oper-
ational efficiency similar to those of domestic banks in sub-
Saharan Africa.
In addition, banks from emerging markets should occupy an intermediary position,
closer to their host markets (culturally and institutionally) than global banks but coming
from a more developed and competitive banking environment than regional African banks,
which should have a positive impact on their operational efficiency. This leads to the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 The foreign affiliates of emerging-market banks exhibit higher
levels of operational efficiency than domestic banks in sub-
Saharan Africa.
2.4. Bank factors
Size is an important factor in explaining bank performance, with large banks benefit-
ing from economies of scale and operating in different market segments from small banks,
4FDI from a developed country to an emerging or developing country.
5This is similar to the Linder hypothesis (Linder, 1961) in international trade according to which
countries will trade intensively with others that share similar demand or consumption patterns. Recently,
Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman (2015) have shown both empirically and theoretically that FDI is
more likely to occur between countries with similar per capita income levels.
6Conversely, global banks may have to “adapt down” their lending technology, which can result in a
cost (“cost of adapting the technology to the local condition”, Dixit, 2011). In addition, their managers
have to adapt to the host country’s institutional environment, and incur the costs of “coping with the bad
governance” (Dixit, 2011). However, through experience in the host country, captured by the number
of years since incorporation, affiliates of global banks can progressively overcome these disadvantages as
the bank management learns from the local context and adapts its strategy.
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which can lead to differences in performance (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). The foreign
affiliates of global banks may benefit from scale economies in operating costs through
affiliation to a large group, in particular via the sharing of IT systems for lending and
risk management. In addition, they can benefit from financial support from their group
via internal capital markets (Stein, 1997; De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2010; Cetorelli and
Goldberg, 2012). This might give them a funding advantage over domestic banks and
other foreign banks belonging to smaller groups, in particular the recently expanding
African regional banks. This funding advantage should result in lower interest expenses.
Furthermore, their brand name might help them attract customers’ deposits, especially
from large corporates operating in sub-Saharan Africa, which could also have a positive
impact on their cost of funding.
Hypothesis 5a The foreign affiliates of global banks exhibit lower interest ex-
penses than domestic banks in sub-Saharan Africa, due to their
affiliation to a large group.
In addition, emerging-markets banks also belong to large banking groups operating
across the world. As such, they may also benefit from group financial support and positive
brand image leading to a lower cost of funding. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5b The foreign affiliates of emerging-market banks exhibit lower in-
terest expenses than domestic banks in sub-Saharan Africa, due
to their affiliation to a large group.
The different factors likely to affect the performance of foreign banks are summarized
in Table A.1, Appendix A. The hypotheses are empirically tested in the following sections.
3. Data
3.1. Data
I use two different sources of data. First I use panel data from the BankScope database
to obtain financial and ownership information on foreign and domestic banks operating
in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, I use novel data from a bank survey to get insights into
the financial management and organization of banks in order to triangulate information
and explain some of the results obtained from the banks’ financial statements.
3.1.1. BankScope data
The sample consists of annual financial data for the 10-year period 2003-2012 for all the
banks active at some point during this period, included in BankScope, in 47 sub-Saharan
countries (all African countries excluding Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and
Sudan). The sample contains 657 banks in total, and includes banks that became inactive
during the period. In 2012 76% of the banks in the sample were active, 16% were dissolved
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(of which 10% were due to mergers or takeovers), 0.15% were bankrupt, 3% were in
liquidation and, for 5% of them, the situation was unknown. The banks included in the
sample are commercial banks (97%), cooperative banks (1%) and savings banks (2%).
To reduce the heterogeneity of the sample, all investment banks, Islamic banks, micro-
finance institutions, private banks, real estate and mortgage banks, and development
banks were excluded, given that they operate in different market segments from those of
traditional commercial banks. In addition to the BankScope data I hand collected data
on the sectoral allocation of banks’ loan portfolios directly from the annual reports of a
subsample of 106 banks which publish this data.
3.1.2. Survey data, sample size and scope
I conducted a bank survey using a questionnaire combining both closed-ended and
open-ended questions. The questionnaire is presented in Appendix B.
In total, I obtained a sample of 77 banks from 14 sub-Saharan African countries. The
questionnaire was completed through both interviews and self-administration by respon-
dents. I conducted fieldwork in Kenya (October-November 2013), Tanzania (November-
December 2013) and Ghana (March-April 2014) to collect data through interviews with
bank managers of domestic and foreign commercial banks. I gathered data on 62 dif-
ferent banks in total during these three pieces of fieldwork, out of a population of 97
banks in total in the three countries, thus obtaining an average response rate of 64%. 27
banks were located in Kenya, 19 in Tanzania and 16 in Ghana. In addition, I collected
data from Uganda (4 banks) and Zambia (2 banks) by emailing the questionnaire to the
banks’ heads of credit. I also contacted the global headquarters of foreign banks with
affiliates in Africa to ask for their help with distributing the questionnaire to their African
subsidiaries. Through this channel I obtained 9 additional questionnaires from foreign
affiliates of global banks in Mali, Ivory Coast, Congo, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Senegal,
Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar and Chad.
The size of the sample is admittedly small. However, this sample size needs to be put
into perspective. First, banking markets in developing countries, and especially in Africa,
tend to be relatively small in terms of number of banks operating in a given market7
compared to more developed countries. As such, the target population itself is relatively
limited. Second, survey data on banking focusing on banks’ practices and organization is
commonly very scarce, with limited sample sizes. For instance, Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and
Mart´ınez Per´ıa (2008) conducted a World Bank survey on banks’ SME lending practices
in 2008 which covered 91 banks from 45 countries around the world but included only
7It is rare for more than 30 banks to operate in a given sub-Saharan country; in addition, according
to Bureau Van Dijk’s BankScope database, in 2012 the average number of foreign banks in sub-Saharan
African countries was 7, ranging from 21 (Tanzania) to 1 (Comoros).
9
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
15 sub-Saharan African banks from 7 countries8. Another more recent survey of SME
financing in four East African countries9, conducted by the African Development Bank
in 2012 (see Calice, Chando and Sekioua, 2012), was based on interviews at 16 different
banks. Apart from the small target population the small size of these samples is also
related to sectoral factors, in particular concerns about confidentiality in the banking
industry. The respondents were mainly heads of credit (retail, SMEs or corporates)
(35%), followed by heads of credit risk or credit administration (26%) and CEOs (14%).
On average the respondents had been in the bank for 7.5 years at the time of the survey,
with a minimum of 6 months and a maximum of 42 years.
Non-response bias analysis. I conduct an analysis of the non-response rate to
examine the possibility of sampling bias. To do so I compare the means of several key
financial indicators of participant and non-participant banks (both domestic and foreign)
surveyed in Kenya, Ghana and Tanzania. I focus on banks located in these three countries,
which constitutes 81% of the sample given that the number of participant banks in the
11 other countries is very small (between one and four respondent banks) and therefore
not representative, while the survey covers 66% of the commercial banks in Kenya, 59%
in Tanzania and 67% in Ghana. The results are reported in Table 1. They indicate
that although participant banks are on average larger by asset, with a higher net income
and higher total capital ratio, the differences are not significant at the 10% level. These
results give confidence that the data does not suffer from major sampling biases due to
banks’ self-selection, at least concerning the bank population in the countries in which
fieldwork has been conducted. Of course, other biases related to the selection of countries
for fieldwork cannot be excluded; however, efforts have been made to obtain data on
different regions of Africa, and the sample includes all the largest banking groups present
in Africa, originating from France, the U.K., the U.S.and India, as well as from North
Africa and sub-Saharan Africa.
— Table 1 insert here —
3.2. Variables of interest: bank ownership dummies
I define three different categories of foreign banks operating in sub-Saharan Africa
based on the home country’s level of development and geographical distance to the host
region. Global banks (“Global MNB”) are banks founded in a developed country. The
“Emerging MNB” category includes banks originating from an emerging or developing
country10 outside the region. Regional African banks (“African MNB”) are banks founded
8Kenya, Malawi, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
9Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.
10In the category “developed countries” I include countries that are classified by the IMF as “high
income”, defined as countries with a GNI/capita at or above $12,615 (2014). For emerging countries I
include both upper middle and lower middle income countries, with a GNI/capita between $1,036 and
$12,615.
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in Africa (including North Africa and South Africa).
Banks’ ownership is determined as follows: I use the Global Ultimate Owner indicator
from the BankScope database. A company is a Global Ultimate Owner (GUO) if it con-
trols at least 50.01% of the entity and has no identified shareholders or if its shareholder’s
percentages are not known. When ownership information was missing in BankScope I
updated it by looking at banks’ websites, using the same definition. For banks which
have a dispersed ownership and for which there is no ultimate owner controlling at least
50.01% of the company I determine the country of origin of the bank by aggregating the
shares of the owners by country of origin, and I attribute bank ownership based on the
nationality of the owners with the highest total percentage of shares11. I also take into
account mergers and acquisitions which have taken place during the sample period by
tracking each bank’s Bureau van Dijk ID number (BVD ID) in the Zephyr database of
Bureau van Dijk, which records M&As. In addition, I checked all mergers and acquisi-
tions that occurred during the sample period to ensure that only the merged entity or
the acquiring bank remained in the sample after the take-over. The ownership indica-
tor changes over the sample period for 8% of the banks in the sample. However, the
composition of the sample varies over time due to the entry and exit of banks from the
four different groups. While in 2003 51% of the banks were domestic banks, 21% were
affiliates of Global MNB, 5% were affiliates of Emerging MNB and 23% were affiliates of
African MNB, in 2012 these percentages were, respectively, 40%, 19%, 6% and 35%. As
such, in the sample the percentage of foreign banks (in terms of numbers) increase from
49% to 59% over the 2003-12 period (see Table A.2 in the Appendix).
3.2.1. Characteristics of banks in the BankScope sample
In 2012, 50% of the banks fell into the category Domestic banks. Among foreign banks
16% were in the category Global MNB, 29% in the category African MNB and 5% in the
category Emerging MNB. Among global multinational banks 34% were from the U.K.,
25% from France and 16% from Portugal. Concerning emerging multinational banks, 36%
were from India and 27% were from Malaysia, while the rest are from the Gulf Countries,
11Note that I differ slightly from Claessens and Van Horen (2013, 2014), who first attributed foreign
ownership to banks for which at least 50% of the shares were held by foreigners, and then summed
the percentages of shares held by foreigners by country of residence, with the country with the highest
percentage of shares considered the source country. For instance, if a bank is held at 60% by 3 foreigners
and the highest percentage of shares owned by one of the 3 foreigners is 39%, and the remaining shares are
domestically-owned, then Claessens and Van Horen’s (2013, 2014) attribute the ownership of the bank
to this foreigner, while I would consider that the bank is a domestic bank. This methodology was chosen
because for many banks with dispersed ownership in sub-Saharan Africa it was much more difficult to
accurately identify all the minority owners, even for large ones, especially when they were individuals,
than to identify the nationality of the largest owner through cross-checking online sources. However, this
difference in methodology only affects 5 banks in the sample, which were classified as domestic whereas
they would have been classified as foreign following Claessens and Van Horen (2013, 2014) methodology.
Given that this study focuses on foreign banks this classification difference is unlikely to affect results.
11
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Russia, Pakistan and Taiwan. Most of the foreign affiliates of regional African banks
belong to Nigerian banking groups (21%), followed by Togolese banks (17%) (essentially
subsidiaries of the large pan-African group Ecobank), Moroccan banks (16%) and South
African banks (15%).
3.2.2. Characteristics of banks in the survey sample
Out of the 77 banks surveyed, 36 are domestic banks, 17 are affiliates of African MNB,
19 are affiliates of Global MNB and 5 are affiliates of emerging-market MNB. Concerning
the foreign affiliates, 38 were organized as subsidiaries and only 3 as branches. In terms
of entry mode, foreign banks tend to favour greenfield entry: 64% of African MNB, 63%
of Global MNB and 75% of Emerging MNB entered these markets through a greenfield
operation. The banks were 27 years old on average at the time of the survey in 2014,
the average incorporation date being 1987, but important variations exist between banks
depending on the country of origin of the parent bank. The oldest group is constituted by
the foreign affiliates of the Global MNB (39 years old on average), followed by Emerging
MNB (37 years old) and domestic banks (24 years old). The foreign affiliates of regional
African MNB are the last entrants (8 years old), which is consistent with the fact that the
expansion of regional African MNB is a relatively recent phenomenon. In terms of size
as measured by the number of employees domestic banks are the largest (1022 employees
on average), followed by Global MNB (650 employees), Emerging MNB (243 employees)
and African MNB (233 employees).
The following section empirically examines the relationship between banks’ ownership
and their financial performance in sub-Saharan Africa.
4. Banks’ ownership and financial performance
4.1. Econometric specification
I use an OLS regression model to examine the relation between banks’ country of origin
and several indicators of financial performance. The baseline equation is the following:
ycit = β1Global MNBit + β2African MNBit + β3Emerging MNBit
+ ρXit + δZ
c
t + αt + γ
c + cit (1)
ycit is the dependent variable, an indicator of financial performance. Xit represents a vector
of time-varying bank-level controls and Zct a vector of time-varying host country controls.
cit is an error term. I relax the assumption of identical and independent distribution
of the errors and I cluster the standard errors at the bank (affiliate) level to allow for
possible correlations between residuals of a bank across time (Petersen, 2009). Year
fixed effects αt are introduced to take into account aggregate (regional) macroeconomic
shocks, and host country c fixed effect γc are included to take into account country-specific
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omitted variables that are time invariant. In alternative specifications I also control for
heterogeneity in the cross-section with year-host country fixed effects in order to compare
banks’ performance within year-host countries. I do not include banks’ fixed effects given
that for 92% of the banks in this sample the ownership dummy variables do not change
over the period studied, leaving too little variation in the data12. I control for many firm,
time and host country factors but the possibility of omitted variable bias, related to the
omission of variables affecting both performance and ownership, remains. The objective
of this research is thus to find out whether there are significant and robust correlations
between the bank ownership dummies and the indicator of financial performance but it
does not attempt to prove causality. The possibility of reverse causality (performance
affecting ownership) is not excluded, although it is relatively low, as this would primarily
be driven by acquisitions of a lower-performing group of banks by another group of banks
but, as mentioned above, changes in ownership only concern less than 10% of the banks
in the sample. In addition, while it may be that performance at time t affects ownership
at time t + 1, it is less likely that it affects ownership at time t, as specified in equation
(1).
Dependent variables (ycit): Measures of financial performance
I use two performance measures. First I employ the return on equity using income
before tax (ROE). I do not use the traditional return on equity based on net income
to avoid accounting differences being driven by different tax regulations. In addition, I
do not use market to book value as a measure of financial performance, despite a long
tradition in the literature on bank performance of using this measure, given that only
57 banks in the sample are listed. Second I use the cost-to-income ratio, calculated as
Overheads / (net Interest Revenue + Other Operating Income), which is traditionally
used in banking to measure operational efficiency. To mitigate the problem of outliers
the dependent variables are Winsorized at 1%. This data comes from the BankScope
database.
Bank ownership dummies
I include the dummies African MNB, Emerging MNB and Global MNB and exclude
the dummy domestic banks ; hence the interpretation of the results for the three ownership
categories is relative to domestic banks, the benchmark.
Control variables
Bank controls (Xit). I control for the relevant country experience of the bank using the
number of foreign subsidiaries of the parent company (the “General Ultimate Owner”) in
sub-Saharan Africa in the year of entry. I also include the year of entry and two dummies
12While the ownership variable changes for only 8% of the banks over the period the composition of
the sample varies over time due to the entry and exit of banks from the four different groups. See Table
A.1 in Appendix A.
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indicating the listed status and government ownership status of the bank, which have
been found to be related to performance (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2001;
Micco, Panizza and Yanez, 2007). The nature of the ownership variables is restrictive
concerning the inclusion of other firm controls. Indeed, the ownership indicator does
not only represent banks’ category of ownership but is also a broader proxy for banks’
capabilities, and operational and management practices, which are likely to be outcomes
of banks’ ownership13. However, for robustness I add a series of balance sheet variables
(lagged) to ensure that the results are not driven by omitted bank balance sheet data.
I add the total assets of the bank (in log, lagged) as a proxy for bank size, the market
share (lagged), the solvency ratio (lagged), measured as the ratio of equity to assets to
capture financial risk, and the loan to deposit ratio (lagged), to control for the bank’s
liquidity position. This data is provided by BankScope.
Host country controls (Zct ). I add a number of host country variables known to
influence banks’ performance (Van Horen, 2007; Claessens and Van Horen, 2014). I
include GDP per capita in U.S. dollars obtained from the IMF World Economic Outlook,
which proxies the level (and sophistication) of the demand in the host market. I also
control for banking regulations, which have been shown to influence bank performance
and affect financial stability (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2004; Laeven and Levine, 2009).
More specifically, I include indicators of entry barriers in the banking sector for foreign
banks (prohibition of entry via joint venture and via branch), which are obtained from the
World Bank’s Bank Regulation and Supervision database (2012). Regulation indicators,
the minimum capital adequacy ratio and the minimum capital requirement, are obtained
directly from central banks’ websites. In addition, I introduce an indicator of market
concentration, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, or HHI14, which I lag by one year to
address the potential reverse causality between concentration and profits15. Finally, I
introduce three regional dummies: East Africa, West Africa and Central Africa (the
omitted dummy being Southern Africa), which capture regional differences in terms of
culture, institutions and level of development.
Summary statistics for banks’ financial variables are presented in Table A.3 in Ap-
pendix A. Global banks are the largest in terms of assets (average assets of US$2.95 billion
over 2003-2012), followed by domestic banks (US$983 million excluding South African
domestic banks, US$2.32 billion including them) and African MNB (US$296 million),
13The category of ownership might influence bank practices such as asset-liability management, risk
management, and bank variables such as bank size.
14According to the Structure Conduct Paradigm (Bain, 1956), banks operating in more concentrated
markets are able to set higher loan rates as a result of non-competitive behaviour or collusion: higher
market concentration thus generates more market power and higher bank profits.
15The idea is the following: high profit margins at time t = 0 allow banks to build barriers to entry,
which determines concentration at t = 1. However, profits at t = 0 do not influence concentration at
t = −1.
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while Emerging MNB record the lowest amount of total assets (US$267 million). Most
of the foreign banks have expanded throughout sub-Saharan Africa in the form of sub-
sidiaries. Only 7 banks in the sample are operating under a branch form. As Beck et al.
(2011) point out, setting up a subsidiary implies higher cost than a branch but it is also
easier for the supervisor to oversee as a subsidiary is organized and regulated according
to the laws of the host country (see also Casu, Girardone and Molyneux, 2006). As such,
according to the World Bank’s Bank Regulation and Supervision 2012 database, a third
of the host African countries in the sample prohibited entry via branches in 2008. While
this might explain the prevalence of subsidiaries as an organizational form it is also im-
portant to note that branches are largely under-reported in BankScope as they do not
publish separate annual reports.
4.2. Empirical results on banks’ performance
Given that the panel is largely unbalanced I look at three different samples. The first
one includes all active banks and banks which became inactive at some point during the
study period, as reported in BankScope. The second one only includes active banks,
thus excluding banks that have exited the market. The third one is a balanced panel of
banks that are active and have no missing data for book assets for the five-year period
2007-2011.
4.2.1. Banks’ Profitability
I use the Return on Equity as the dependent variable using income before tax (ROE).
Table 2 reports the results on the determinants of banks’ performance in sub-Saharan
Africa for the three different samples.
— Table 2 insert here —
I examine first the sample containing both currently active and inactive banks. In
model 1 the coefficient on the Global MNB dummy is positive and significant at the 1
percent level, indicating that Global MNB have significantly higher ROE than domestic
banks. While in model 1 I use several host country controls capturing the level of de-
velopment of the country (GDP per capita), the degree of market competition (lagged
HHI index), indicators of banking regulation and African geographic area dummies, in
model 2 I apply host country fixed effects. I add further bank controls reflecting the
financial strength of the banks as well as their experience in the region. The signifi-
cant increase in the R-squared between the two models suggests that there are indeed
significant country effects and bank effects affecting the performance of banks that are
not totally captured by the control variables in model 1. In model 3 I include year-host
country fixed effects instead of separate year and host country fixed effects, which would
capture any cross-section heterogeneity at the year-host country level. As such, instead
of controlling for regional, sub-Saharan, macro-economic shocks, as in model 2, model 3
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controls for temporal variations in macro-economic conditions at the country level. The
R-squared of model 3 compared to model 2 increases slightly; the parameter estimates
of the ownership dummies also change but marginally. Overall, being a Global MNB is
associated with an ROE between 7 percentage points to 9 percentage points higher on
average than that of a domestic bank, depending on whether bank controls, host country
dummies or year#host country dummies are included.
Concerning the other groups of banks, we note that the coefficient on African MNB is
either negative or positive but never significant in the three models considered. Finally,
the difference between Emerging MNB and domestic banks in terms of ROE is positive
and significant once further controls are included (models (2) and (3)), with a ROE
being on average 10 percentage points higher. Turning to the second panel consisting
exclusively of active banks (“survivor banks”), the results are qualitatively similar, with
a ROE for Global MNB being on average 7 percentage points higher and the ROE for
Emerging MNB being on average 10 percentage points higher than that of domestic banks.
However, the difference between African MNB and domestic banks is not significant and
the size of the coefficient is close to 0.
In the 5-year balanced panel (2007-2011), which controls for time of both entry and
exit of banks, the coefficients remain similar in magnitude to those in the previous speci-
fications but the coefficients on the Global MNB dummy lose significance. This might be
related to the higher exit rate of domestic banks and their later entry (1982 on average
as year of incorporation for domestic banks against 1972 for Global MNB, see Figure
A.1 in Appendix A). Once this is controlled for the difference in performance between
both groups of banks disappear. In terms of controls we note that both total assets and
market share are positively related to performance with a significant coefficient, which is
in line with expectations. The coefficient on the solvency ratio has a negative sign and is
significant at the 5% level when host country and year fixed effects are included but the
significance drops to only 10% when year#host country fixed effects are included. This
negative relationship between solvency ratio and performance might be related to the
fact that African banking systems, although lacking in depth compared to other regions
in the world, tend to be excessively liquid because African banks lend little (Honohan
and Beck 2007; Andrianova et al., 2015). The other bank controls, in particular the year
of entry, number of foreign subsidiaries and the loan to deposit ratio are not significant.
Comparing the coefficients for the different dummies the results suggest that Global
MNB tend to outperform domestic banks and African MNB but not Emerging MNB. The
performance of African MNB is consistently and significantly lower than that of both
domestic banks and the other two categories of foreign banks. These two results (the
out-performance of Global MNB and the under-performance of African MNB) highlights
the significant disparity among foreign banks. Finally, while I control for a large number
of firm and host country observable variables, there may be remaining unobservables that
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may generate a direct effect of ownership on firms’ ROE (omitted variable bias). I use the
methodology developed by Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) and applied by Beck, Degryse,
De Haas and Van Horen (2017) in the banking literature to gauge the relative importance
of omitted variable bias. I examine how the coefficient for the ownership dummies changes
when I include a larger set of covariates. If this change is substantial then it is more likely
that adding more (currently unobservable) covariates would further reduce the estimated
impact. In contrast, if the coefficient turns out to be stable when adding controls, then
we can be more confident when interpreting the results in a causal sense. Coefficient
stability is measured by the ratio between the value of the coefficient in the regression
including controls (numerator) and the difference between this coefficient and one derived
from a regression without covariates (denominator). The ratio in column 1 is based on
a comparison of the baseline (reported) specification with an unreported specification
excluding all controls (only keeping the ownership dummies and the year fixed effects).
The ratios in columns (2)-(7) are based on a comparison of the reported specification with
an unreported specification excluding the following firm controls: assets, market share,
solvency ratio, loan to deposit ratio, foreign subsidiaries and year of entry. Regarding
Global MNB, the absolute value of this ratio is between 1.8 (column (2)) and 66 (column
(1)). This suggests that, to explain the full effect of the Global MNB dummy, the
covariance between unobserved factors and the Global MNB dummy needs to be at
least two times as high as the covariance of the included controls. We can conclude
that unobservables are unlikely to explain the entire effect of Global MNB on ROE.
Concerning Emerging MNB coefficients, the Altonji ratios are much lower, around -1.
The negative sign reflects the fact that the coefficient for Emerging MNB actually slightly
increases when the set of covariates is included, suggesting that the estimates somewhat
underestimate the true causal effect. In the case of the Emerging MNB dummy selection
on unobservables would have to be as strong as the selection on observables to explain the
effect. Since the ratio of selection on unobservables relative to selection on observables is
likely to be less than 1 (Altonji et al., 2005), part of the Emerging MNB effect on ROE
is probably real.
As a further robustness test I re-estimate the specifications on the smaller sample
of surveyed banks in Table 3. I obtain qualitatively similar results on the three panels,
although the magnitude of the coefficients is relatively larger than those in Table 216.
This provides reassurance that the pattern observed among the surveyed banks is similar
to that in the larger population of banks in sub-Saharan Africa.
Overall, these results suggest that there are stable performance differences between
16This might be because the African countries where the fieldwork was conducted (Kenya, Tanzania,
Ghana) are amongst the most developed banking markets in sub-Saharan Africa. It is possible that
Global MNB and Emerging MNB invest relatively more in these markets, which translates into higher
financial performance.
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the foreign affiliates of Global MNB and Emerging MNB and the domestic banks in
sub-Saharan Africa, with foreign banks recording higher ROEs, except for the foreign
affiliates of African MNB, for which the difference from domestic banks is not significant.
This supports the first hypothesis, according to which Global MNB perform better than
domestic banks.
The next section aims to identify the drivers of performance by first examining the
operational efficiency of banks and then decomposing their profit into its revenues and
expenses components.
— Table 3 insert here —
4.2.2. Banks’ operational efficiency
Cost-to-income ratio as the dependent variable. The dependent variable is the
cost-to-income ratio and the estimations are done on the three panels. The results are
reported in Table 4. The coefficient on the dummy Global MNB is always negative but
it is only significant in the first panel. This might be because these banks derive their
operational efficiency from their larger size as measured by total assets (scale effects).
The coefficient on total assets is significantly negative, which may suggest a potential
multicollinearity effect. In further (non-reported) estimations I excluded the total assets
variable and the coefficient on Global MNB was significantly negative in the survivor and
balanced panels. Concerning African MNB, the coefficient is alternatively positive and
negative, depending on the specifications, but it is never significant.
The difference in operational efficiency, as measured by the cost-to-income ratio, be-
tween the African MNB and the Global MNB dummies is positive, meaning that African
MNB are less efficient than Global MNB, but it is only significant in Model 1. This
only partially supports the second hypothesis, which states that Global MNB are more
efficient than African MNB. However, the third hypothesis, according to which African
MNB exhibit levels of operational efficiency similar to those of domestic banks in sub-
Saharan Africa, is supported by the results, as no significant difference is observed in the
cost-to-income ratio between these two groups of banks.
Finally, the coefficient on Emerging MNB is always negative, when bank’s size (to-
tal assets) is controlled for, and it becomes significant and large (between 27 and 29)
when further controls are included. In addition, the difference in coefficients between the
Emerging MNB and African MNB dummies, and between the Global MNB and Emerg-
ing MNB dummies, is significant. This higher operational efficiency for Emerging MNB
might be related to the types of customers that they serve, often adopting a niche strategy
by lending predominantly to a specific population group (for instance, the Bank of India
or Bank of Baroda financing the business of the Indian diaspora). Overall, the results
suggest that Emerging MNB exhibit higher operational efficiency than domestic banks.
This conforms to the fourth hypothesis.
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— Table 4 insert here —
Operational efficiency: technological transfer from the parent bank. Cost-
to-income ratios are driven by operating costs in the numerator such as spending on IT
infrastructure. When banks are part of a larger group they can achieve economies of scale
in operating systems, which should drive down their operating costs. A foreign affiliate
of a large banking group may receive its IT and operating systems directly from the
headquarters, which should reduce its operating expenses. Using survey data I examine
the extent to which different categories of foreign banks receive support from their group
in key areas of banking operations. In the survey respondents were asked to rate on a
scale of 0 “none” to 3 “a lot” the extent to which they received information and technical
support from their group in 5 areas of business operations: marketing know-how, IT and
technological know-how, operational risk management techniques (fraud and corruption
and process management), credit risk management techniques, and lending technology.
I then take the unweighted average across all 5 items as the primary measure of support
from headquarters (henceforth, “Group Support index”). The Group Support Index
ranges from 0 to 3, a higher score indicating a higher level of support. Foreign affiliates
depend more heavily on their headquarters for their IT systems (68% responded “a lot”)
and for their lending technology (34% responded “a lot”), while around a third mentioned
that they depended a lot on their headquarters for their operational risk and credit risk
management, with only 8% depending on them for their marketing (see Figure 1).
— Figure 1 insert here —
The results reported in Table 5 indicate that the foreign affiliates of Global MNB
receive more information and technical support from their group than foreign affiliates of
African MNB or of Emerging MNB, especially in the domain of operational risk manage-
ment techniques (fraud and corruption, process management) and credit risk management
techniques. T-tests to compare means of the Group Support Index between these banks
indicate that the differences are significant at the 5% level.
In addition, and consistently with the finding that foreign affiliates of Global MNB
receive more technical support from their headquarters, the survey data collected also
reveals that foreign affiliates of Global MNB receive more training from their group. 80%
of bank managers of foreign affiliates of Global MNB indicated that they received training
from their global headquarters on at least a bi-annual basis, while only 45% of managers
of foreign affiliates of African MNB and 50% of managers of foreign affiliates of Emerging
MNB declared that this was the case.
— Table 5 insert here —
Overall the survey data provides some evidence that foreign affiliates of Global MNB
receive more information and technical support from their headquarters, consistent with
them belonging to large groups with high operational capacity. This could also explain
their slightly lower cost-to-income ratio through group-level scale economies in operating
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platforms.
Having established that Global MNB and Emerging MNB are consistently more prof-
itable than domestic banks the next section examines the drivers of these performance
differences in more depth.
5. Channels at work: investigating the drivers of performance differences
5.1. Interest income vs. interest expenses
To further investigate the drivers of financial performance I decompose the profit
measure into its accounting components. Banks’ profits are driven by net interest margins
and non interest expenditures. Indeed, banks’ profit before tax satisfies the following
accounting identity:
Profit before tax = Net interest margin + (noninterest income− overheads
− other noninterest expenditures− loan loss provisioning)
(2)
As such, I re-estimate equation (1) with, alternatively, interest income and interest ex-
penses (the difference between these two elements constituting the net interest margin)
and bad loans (which impacts profit through lower interest income and higher loan loss
provisioning) as dependent variables. The results for the three different samples of banks
are presented in Table 6.
— Table 6 insert here —
The first column reports the ratio of interest income to average earning assets. In
the first panel both African MNB and Emerging MNB report lower levels of interest
income than domestic banks. However, the coefficient on the Emerging MNB dummy
loses significance in the survivor sample and it is not significant in the balanced panel.
For African MNB it remains significant at the 1% level in the survivor panel but it is
weakly significant (at the 10% level) in the balanced panel.
The coefficient for Global MNB is always negative but never significant. The results
in column 2, which reports the ratio of interest expenses to interest bearing liabilities,
suggest that, while there are no significant differences between Global MNB and domestic
banks in terms of interest income, there is however a significant difference between these
two groups of banks concerning interest expenses generated by average interest-bearing
liabilities. Indeed, Global MNB, as well as Emerging MNB and, to a lesser extent, African
MNB, have a ratio of interest expenses to average liabilities that is on average one percent-
age point lower than that of domestic banks. However, while the difference is significant
at the 5% level for Global MNB and Emerging MNB, it is only weakly significant (or
non significant, depending on the specification) for African MNB. This indicates that the
foreign affiliates of both Global MNB and Emerging MNB have lower funding costs than
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domestic banks, as interest expenses comprise interests paid on deposits and borrowings
to fund the loan portfolio. This supports hypotheses 5a and 5b.
In columns (3) and (4) I further investigate whether the difference in performance
between foreign banks and domestic banks is related to the quality of their loan portfolio
as identified by their level of bad loans. I use two different measures of bad loans, the
ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans and the ratio of impaired loans to equity. I
find that Global MNB have significantly lower levels of NPL/gross loans (but not when
estimated on the balanced panel), while the difference is not significant for Emerging
MNB and African MNB. Concerning impaired loans to equity, I find that only Emerging
MNB record significantly lower impaired loans to equity than domestic banks. Impaired
loans have a negative impact on the income statement: they reduce banks’ profit as they
generate an increase in the provision for loan losses.
Overall these results indicate that lower interest expenses explain the differences in
ROE between Global MNB and domestic banks, and between Emerging MNB and do-
mestic banks. There may be two (non-exclusive) reasons why domestic banks face higher
interest expenses than foreign banks. It might be because foreign banks pay lower in-
terest for a given category of funding - this would be the case, for instance, if they paid
higher interest on deposits than the foreign affiliates of Global MNB. It could also be
that the foreign bank affiliates have a different liability mix. It would have an impact
on their interest expenses if, for instance, foreign affiliates of Global MNB had a higher
percentage of their funding composed of customer deposits, which pay low or zero interest
to customers, while domestic banks were more exposed to longer-term financing bearing
a higher interest cost. I do not have detailed information on the interest paid by banks
for specific funds but I am able to examine whether the liability profiles of the groups of
banks differ. The results are presented in the next sub-section.
5.2. Explaining differences in interest expenses: the liability mix
I examine whether the lower cost of funding of global banks is due to differences in
the liability mix.
5.2.1. BankScope data
I use data from BankScope to investigate this issue further. Given the smaller number
of banks reporting a detailed liability break-down, the sample size is reduced to 287
banks in total. The data in Table 7 suggests that a composition effect related to the
liability mix may be driving the performance results: the foreign affiliates of Global MNB
and Emerging MNB have a significantly lower share of their total funding composed of
short-term capital compared to domestic banks. Foreign banks (in particular Global
MNB and Emerging MNB) have a significantly higher share of their funding composed
of current deposits (which may bear low or zero interest) than domestic banks, while
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they have a significantly lower share of their funding composed of saving deposits, which
generally pay higher interest than current accounts. Overall this suggests that the foreign
banks’ affiliates have a significantly different liability mix compared to domestic banks.
In particular, they are less exposed to funding sources that bear higher interests, which
translates into lower interest expenses and higher ROE. This further supports hypotheses
5a and 5b.
— Table 7 insert here —
5.2.2. Survey findings
Evidence from the bank survey corroborates this finding: foreign affiliates of Global
MNB tend to benefit from a large deposit base through financing large corporates and
institutional clients. In addition, large global banks tend to be very well established in
the retail market and therefore have easy access to current customer deposits. Access to
current customer deposits was a concern for a significant number of the small domestic
banks surveyed. Indeed, while a large majority of the bank respondents across all bank
categories considered that access to the interbank market was easy (83% of the banks
considered that access to the interbank market was easy, somewhat easy or very easy),
only 60% of the respondents considered that it was easy to gather customer deposits, with
significant differences between banks. Respondents from foreign affiliates of global banks
perceived access to deposits as easier than respondents from domestic banks and foreign
affiliates of African MNB and Emerging MNB. Indeed, 45% of the domestic banks, 59%
of the African MNB and 60% of the Emerging MNB surveyed considered that it was
easy17 to access deposits, whereas this number was close to 90% for Global MNB. The
difference in the perception of access to deposits is significant between Global MNB and
domestic banks (see Table 8).
It is worth noting that while global banks,in the context of Africa, benefit from access
to cheaper sources of funding through their ability to attract deposits locally, in Central
and Eastern Europe foreign banks also have a competitive advantage in accessing cheap
funding but this is gained through their ability to tap into the internal capital market of
their multinational group (De Haas and van Lelyveld, 2010).
In Africa the global brand of global banks helps them garner customers’ trust and
attract customer deposits in a context of weaker local competition and less credible
deposit insurance mechanisms as compared with Eastern Europe. Most of the survey
respondents who perceived access to customer deposit to be difficult cited competition
issues, followed by high interest rates to pay on deposits. These results further support
hypothesis 5a, according to which the foreign affiliates of global banks exhibit lower
interest expenses than the other groups of banks due to their affiliation to a large group.
17Includes the categories “somewhat easy”, “easy” and “very easy”.
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— Table 8 insert here —
Overall these additional findings suggest that the higher ROE of the foreign affiliates
of Global MNB and Emerging MNB relative to those of domestic banks is due to lower
interest expenses, related to the composition of their liability mix, as a significantly higher
proportion of their funding base consists of low cost demand deposits in comparison to
domestic banks. In other words, the lower performance of domestic banks is due to
higher cost of funding, while there is no evidence of significant differences in their ability
to generate interest income.
In the next section I examine this last point further, investigating whether these
performance differences are related to segmentation in the loan market.
6. Alternative explanation: market segmentation
A potential composition effect that might account for the difference in performance
between groups of banks is related to the existence of market segmentation and stable
differences in the composition of the loan portfolio between banks. Indeed, if some banks
have a portfolio which primarily consists of loans to sectors with high return and/or
low risk with low levels of bad loans, then these banks might have a competitive ad-
vantage which then translates into higher profits. In other words, if different categories
of foreign banks cater to different market segments then foreign banks’ heterogeneity in
a host country could be explained, and sustained, by product differentiation and niche
markets. In particular, prior research suggests that foreign banks “cherry-pick” borrow-
ers in developing countries (Detragiache, Gupta, and Tressel 2008; Beck and Martinez
Peria 2010; Gormley 2010, 2014), undermining overall access to credit. In this section, I
examine two different aspects of the composition of banks’ portfolios: the allocation of
loans by business segments (corporate, retail), and the allocation of loans by economic
sectors. The econometric specifications are based on equation (1), with a measure of loan
portfolio allocation as the dependent variable and the same three ownership dummies as
explanatory variables. I obtain data on loans from three different sources.
The first source is the BankScope database, which provides information on loans
to the retail and corporate sectors. I then complement this data with information on
loan portfolio allocation by economic sector, which I hand-collected from banks’ annual
reports. I obtained information on a subsample of 106 banks which publish data on the
sectoral allocation of their loans in their annual reports. This sample of banks reporting
the allocation of loans by sector is an unbalanced panel over the period 2003-2012.
The third data source that I use to further examine the differences in loan portfolios
within the corporate segment (SMEs vs. large corporates) is the survey data. Rather
than giving banks a predetermined size classification of banks, the survey questionnaire
directly asks banks their definition of SMEs. In this respect, it follows the methodology
employed by Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Mart´ınez Per´ıa (2011) for their survey of bank
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SME financing around the world. Close to 80% of the banks surveyed define SMEs
according to their annual turnover, the rest of the banks defining them according to
their transaction amounts. On average, the annual turnover varies between US$200,000
and US$5 million and the transaction amount varies between US$3,000 and US$300,000,
depending on the client and the bank. These numbers are consistent with banks’ SME
definitions reported in Beck, et al. (2011).
6.1. Allocation of loans by business segment
I use information obtained from BankScope on the type of customers to which banks
extend their loans. The results are reported in Table 9. All the foreign affiliates have a
lower percentage of their loan portfolio exposed to the residential mortgage segment than
domestic banks. The result is significant at the 5% level and robust to the inclusion of
additional controls. This can be explained by better knowledge of local conditions among
domestic banks, allowing them to extend more retail mortgage loans, while foreign banks
may be more reluctant to provide loans to retail customers to finance housing projects.
This is in contrast to findings obtained in Eastern Europe (De Haas, Ferreira and Taci,
2010), where foreign banks, and in particular greenfield foreign banks, are significantly
more involved in mortgage lending than private domestic banks, having exported their
knowledge and lending methods for mortgage products to this region, where mortgage
markets were absent before the end of Communism.
— Table 9 insert here —
I further investigate the differences between banks in terms of the types of corporate
customers in their loan portfolio, distinguishing between small and medium enterprises
(SMEs) and large corporates, relying on the survey data presented above. The results,
reported in Table 10, indicate that there are no significant differences between the four
categories of banks (global, emerging, African and domestic banks) in the shares of their
portfolios allocated to SMEs and large corporates once bank and country controls are
included. Concerning retail loans, the survey data shows that Emerging MNB have a
significantly lower exposure to the retail segment than domestic banks, which reflects a
niche market strategy focusing on corporates.
This finding corroborates that of Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria and Sanchez (2005),
according to which larger foreign banks have greater impacts on access to financial ser-
vices for small and medium-sized enterprises in Latin America, potentially due to higher
commitment to the market, while smaller banks are more niche players. Similar findings
regarding the role of foreign banks as financiers of SMEs were obtained in the context of
Eastern Europe by De Haas, Ferreira and Taci (2010), who found that foreign banks lent
significantly less to large firms when compared to private domestic banks, with greenfield
foreign banks lending roughly between 15 and 17 percentage points less to large firms
than a domestic private bank would.
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This data is admittedly limited but it further suggests that there are no significant
differences between foreign banks in their allocations of loans by business segment, and
especially there are no significant differences between foreign banks and domestic banks
in the shares of their loan portfolios allocated to the SME segment.
— Table 10 insert here —
6.2. Allocation of loans by economic sectors
Finally, I examine the sectoral allocation of loans in Table 11 using data obtained
directly from banks’ annual reports.18
The results indicate that Global MNB are significantly more exposed to the manufac-
turing sector but significantly less exposed to extractive industries. In contrast, Emerging
MNB are significantly more exposed to extractive industries but also to public utilities,
the manufacturing sector, transport and government and para-statal organizations com-
pared to domestic banks. Emerging MNB are also less exposed to trade and tourism
and the social and education sector. Finally, African MNB report a significantly higher
exposure to the transport and communication sectors. As such, although I do not find
strong evidence of market segmentation with respect to types of loans (retail vs. corpo-
rate), I do find that Global MNB and Emerging MNB finance the manufacturing sector
more than domestic banks do, and that Emerging MNB offer relatively more loans to the
extractive industries sector as a percentage of their total loans. This is consistent with
the fact that FDI from China and India began their expansion in Africa in the natural
resource extraction industry (Beck et al., 2011). I do not find any significant difference
between banks with respect to the agriculture sector, construction sector, finance sector,
foreign trade and micro small business sectors. This result also corroborates Beck et al.’s
(2011:43) findings that the agricultural sector is significantly underrepresented in the loan
books of all banks, while trade and commerce and construction are overrepresented in
the loan books of African MNB.
— Table 11 insert here —
To sum up, I find only weak evidence of market segmentation along customer niches
and, more specifically, I do not find that global banks offer significantly more loans to
corporate clients than domestic banks. As such, with the limitations of the data at hand,
I do not find strong evidence that the heterogeneity of foreign banks’ performance is
primarily driven by market segmentation on the asset side of the business: once again,
18Only 21% of the active banks in the BankScope sample report the sectoral allocations of their loan
portfolios. I conducted a preliminary comparison of means between the group of banks which reports this
sectoral loan data and that which does not. I found that the reporting banks were significantly larger (by
total assets). In addition, the means differences between the two groups in terms of financial performance
indicated that reporting banks tended to record higher ROEs over the sample period. However, this
difference was not significant at the 5% level for foreign banks, which suggests that potential sampling
biases were not strongly related to performance measures.
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the performance difference between these two groups of banks seems to be driven by
differences in interest expenses (the cost of capital), rather than differences in interest
income (their ability to generate revenues from banking activities, in particular lending).
7. Discussion and Conclusion
Using financial statements data from BankScope and survey data this research found
that regional African banks were significantly less profitable (ROE) and cost efficient than
affiliates of global banks in sub-Saharan African host markets. This is in line with the
results of Claessens and Van Horen (2012), who found that geographical closeness does
not improve performance in host developing countries. Similarly to Claessens, Demirgu¨c¸-
Kunt and Huizinga (2001) and Claessens and Van Horen (2012), I also found that foreign
banks from developed countries outperformed domestic banks in developing countries,
while foreign banks from developing countries performed worse than domestic banks.
However, while the foreign affiliates of African MNB under-perform compared to domestic
banks, those from emerging markets outside the region (“Emerging MNB”) record higher
performance than domestic banks, highlighting the heterogeneity among the group of
developing and emerging country banks.
The five research hypotheses were empirically supported, although the second hypoth-
esis, according to which Global MNB are more operationally efficient than African MNB,
was only partially supported by the empirical evidence.
Overall the research does not suggest that the affiliates of regional African banks are
better able to operate in sub-Saharan Africa than global banks. In other words, it does
not seem that they have a specific home or regional advantage, related to a lower cultural
and institutional distance, when operating in Africa. This raises the following question:
Why do foreign regional African banks survive despite systematically under-performing
compared to both other foreign banks, particularly global banks, and domestic banks?
A first explanation could be that there are important quality differences between
customers inside each market segment.
There is still the possibility of cream-skimming of the best borrowers within each
economic sector and business segment by global banks, without observing significant
differences between foreign banks in terms of the overall sectoral and business allocations
of their loan portfolios. Variations in the quality of customers and their associated costs,
especially the cost of screening and monitoring, could then translate into significant and
stable variations in performance between banks.
Secondly, as Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) have shown for manufacturing firms, in
countries with low competition the dispersion of firms’ productivity tends to be higher.
Given that most sub-Saharan African banking markets are characterized by a high level
of concentration and relatively low market competition this may also explain why lower-
performing (regional African) banks do not exit the market. In addition, it is important
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to note that even in the most competitive markets, such as Kenya, where more than 40
banks operate and compete for the same customers, all the banks are actually generat-
ing substantial profits, and consolidation has not yet occurred. In this market interest
spreads, especially in the SME segment, are still very high and the banks have not reduced
them despite a reduction in operational costs over the years (see Osoro (2013)).
The higher performance of global banks may also be related to higher levels of op-
erational capacity, embedded in their organization, allowing them to benefit from lower
operating and funding costs. In particular, the survey showed that global banks received
significantly more operational support (in terms of IT, technology, risk management tech-
niques etc.) than other groups of foreign banks.
One limitation of this research concerns the availability and quality of financial data on
banks. Financial data is missing for a few banks in years in which they have been active
(most often the latest years) and not all the commercial banks in Africa are included
in BankScope, although this non-reporting only concerns the smaller banks and those
which were incorporated most recently. These omissions are, however, unlikely to affect
the results substantially, and may in fact indicate that they are conservative estimates:
given that most of the omitted banks in BankScope are banks which were only recently
incorporated and that foreign affiliates of regional African banks are those which have
most recently entered new markets in their neighbouring countries, including these banks
may lower the average measures of financial performance of regional African banks if we
consider that new entrants tend to face a higher risk of exit due to lower performance.
A second data limitation concerns the lack of detailed information at the loan level, in
particular on the amounts and interest rates of the loans and sizes of the borrowing firms.
As mentioned above, there is still the possibility that large foreign (global) banks “cream-
skim” borrowers within each category (retail/SMEs/corporate), even though there is no
significant evidence that these banks are less exposed to SMEs. In addition, having
more detailed information at the loan level would also allow us to examine the welfare
implications for host markets of the presence of foreign banks. The results obtained
in this study may be interpreted as evidence that regional African banks increase the
fragility of the host banking system as they are associated with lower performance, while
global banks may improve the stability of the banking system. At the same time, it
may be that regional banks are more exposed to the tail-end of the SME segment and to
non-traditional borrowers excluded by global banks, which face high financing constraints
despite being crucial for economic development. This preliminary analysis of the drivers
of banks’ performance needs to be complemented with more fine-grained information on
banks’ loan portfolios to infer policy implications for FDI in the banking sector. The
implications for future research of these findings are twofold. First, the empirical results
have shown that developing and developed country MNEs are associated with different
strategies, and perform differently in the host markets. As a consequence, they do not
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have the same impacts on the host economies. This stresses the need to take into account
the level of development of the country of origin of foreign banks when examining foreign
multinationals’ entry into host markets. Secondly, this research poses the question of
the sustainability, or even existence, of potential “home region advantages” provided by
a supposedly deeper knowledge of the local context. This research suggests that the
advantages of closeness are limited when foreign competitors are highly productive and
global.
Understanding how time, as well as host and home countries’ specific factors, affect
the prevalence of these advantages and disadvantages constitutes an avenue for future re-
search. One potential lesson for developing countries’ banks embarking on international
expansion in other developing countries is that to catch up with developed country banks
they should build on their knowledge of developing environments by further specializing
in niche customer markets untapped by developed countries’ multinationals. In the bank-
ing sector in particular this research suggests that access to low-cost deposits is key to
unlocking performance. Given the large unbanked population in African markets there
are still many opportunities for regional African banks to tap into local deposits.
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Table 1: Analysis of non-response bias - Means comparison of participant vs. non-
participant banks
This table presents an analysis of non-response bias, using T-test to compare the means of several key financials
of participant and non-participant commercial banks in the survey in Tanzania, Kenya and Ghana. Financials
are from the BankScope database, for the last year available. NS: Non Significant.
Financials Participant Non-Participant Difference in Means
Mean Obs. Mean Obs T-test
ALL BANKS
Total Assets (millions USD) 710 48 536 28 0.88NS
Net Income (thous. USD) 20415 48 15077 28 0.67NS
Net Interest Margin (%) 7.9 47 8.3 27 -0.54NS
Total Capital Ratio (%) 24.0 36 23.7 16 0.05NS
Number of employees 406 20 458 11 -0.26NS
FOREIGN BANKS
Total Assets (millions USD) 577 24 447 17 0.70NS
Net Income (thous. USD) 14154 24 15541 17 -0.17NS
Net Interest Margin (%) 7.7 23 9.2 16 -1.04NS
Total Capital Ratio (%) 26.4 22 20.5 12 0.73NS
Number of employees 274 13 532 9 -1.32NS
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Table 2: Bank financial performance and bank ownership in sub-Saharan Africa
This table presents the results of multivariate regression analyses of bank performance using OLS estimation.
The dependent variable is return on equity using income before tax. The excluded ownership dummy is Domestic
Bank. Constants are included but not reported. The Altonji ratios are measured following Altonji, Elder and
Taber (2005). The ratios are based on a comparison of the baseline specification (shown in these columns)
to an (unreported) specification without controls. The ratio in column 1 is based on a comparison of the
baseline (reported) specification to an unreported specification excluding all controls (only keeping the ownership
dummies and the year fixed effects). The ratios in columns (2)-(7) are based on a comparison of the reported
specification to an unreported specification excluding the following firm controls: assets, market share, solvency
ratio, loan to deposit ratio, foreign subsidiaries, year of entry. The Altonji ratio equals the value of the coefficient
in the regression including the controls divided by the difference between this coefficient and the one derived
from the regression without the controls Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are adjusted for
bank clustering with values reported beneath each coefficient estimate in parenthesis. The dependent variable
is Winsorized at 1%. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
All banks (657) Survivor banks (495) 5-year Balanced panel (217)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Global MNB 8.670*** 6.717** 7.633** 6.945** 7.515** 6.151 5.942
(2.698) (3.004) (3.138) (3.082) (3.230) (3.740) (3.892)
African MNB -4.520 -0.802 0.522 -1.260 -0.238 0.639 0.458
(3.032) (2.695) (2.826) (2.743) (2.872) (3.274) (3.468)
Emerging MNB 0.901 9.518*** 10.297*** 9.714*** 10.342*** 10.410** 10.070**
(3.311) (3.361) (3.608) (3.275) (3.519) (4.350) (4.609)
Listed company 12.941*** 2.856 3.296 3.388 3.804 5.957* 6.218*
(2.558) (2.900) (3.108) (2.955) (3.162) (3.207) (3.394)
HHI, lagged 13.865* -9.110 -11.690* -9.431 -10.806* 1.165 1.932
(7.182) (5.762) (6.342) (5.819) (6.523) (5.071) (6.477)
GDP per capita (host) ’00 USD 0.090 0.125 0.133 -0.095
(0.070) (0.116) (0.121) (0.117)
Minimum capital req. (host), ’000 USD 0.134* -0.210* -0.195* -0.067
(0.076) (0.108) (0.113) (0.299)
Total assets, log, lagged 4.197*** 4.041*** 3.924*** 3.762*** 2.736** 1.945
(1.143) (1.364) (1.167) (1.379) (1.379) (1.587)
Market share, lagged 22.851** 32.163*** 25.886*** 34.344*** 19.476* 31.213**
(9.449) (11.536) (9.624) (11.739) (11.059) (13.698)
Solvency ratio, lagged -0.219** -0.173* -0.217** -0.179* -0.270** -0.254*
(0.086) (0.092) (0.088) (0.094) (0.125) (0.137)
Loan to deposit ratio, lagged 0.502 0.477 0.491 0.478 0.304 0.345
(0.335) (0.419) (0.342) (0.429) (0.305) (0.375)
Foreign subs. Africa at inc. -0.489 -0.565 -0.526 -0.598 -0.247 -0.166
(0.443) (0.451) (0.442) (0.451) (0.424) (0.443)
Year of entry 0.004 0.021 0.003 0.019 0.020 0.020
(0.033) (0.036) (0.033) (0.036) (0.047) (0.050)
Minimum capital adequacy ratio (host) -29.210
(98.184)
Prohibition of entry via JV (host) -6.062
(4.103)
Prohibition of entry via branch (host) 5.773
(3.771)
East Africa -1.668
(3.636)
West Africa -9.857**
(3.921)
Central Africa 3.625
(3.938)
Observations 1,977 1,855 1,855 1,804 1,804 886 886
Adjusted R-squared 0.086 0.236 0.256 0.241 0.257 0.230 0.210
Year FE
Host country FE
Year#Host country FE
Wald test, F-Stat
Test Africa-Global 13.61*** 6.31** 4.93** 7.35*** 5.75** 1.91 1.71
Test Africa-Emerging 1.74 8.10*** 6.53** 9.53*** 7.99*** 4.12** 3.47*
Test Global-Emerging 3.99** 0.58 0.45 0.57 0.51 0.75 0.62
Altonji ratio Global MNB 65.682 1.777 2.197 1.848 2.093 -13.761 -38.335
Altonji ratio African MNB 1.904 0.130 -0.075 0.197 0.034 -0.146 -0.107
Altonji ratio Emerging MNB -0.320 -1.098 -1.061 -1.097 -1.059 -0.982 -1.010
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Table 3: Bank financial performance and bank ownership in sub-Saharan Africa - SURVEY
SAMPLE
This table presents the results of multivariate regression analyses of bank performance based on the survey
sample using OLS estimation. The dependent variable is return on equity using income before tax. The excluded
ownership dummy is Domestic Bank. Constants are included but not reported. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and are adjusted for bank clustering with values reported beneath each coefficient estimate
in parenthesis. The dependent variable is Winsorized at 1%. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
All banks (657) Survivor banks (495) 5-year Balanced panel (217)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Global MNB 12.320** 11.753** 11.855* 11.753** 11.855* 5.100 3.344
(5.178) (5.736) (6.130) (5.736) (6.130) (3.149) (3.287)
African MNB -17.822** 6.757 7.187 6.757 7.187 3.539 2.435
(8.481) (7.316) (8.479) (7.316) (8.479) (4.856) (4.944)
Emerging MNB 1.782 30.228*** 29.850*** 30.228*** 29.850*** 32.396*** 31.963***
(8.299) (6.106) (6.991) (6.106) (6.991) (4.358) (4.345)
Observations 332 261 261 261 261 144 144
Adjusted R-squared 0.212 0.441 0.439 0.441 0.439 0.477 0.545
Year FE
Host country FE
Year#Host country FE
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Table 4: Bank operational efficiency and bank ownership in sub-Saharan Africa
This table presents the results of multivariate regression analyses of bank performance for three different samples
(all banks, survivor banks, and 5-year balanced panel), using OLS estimation. The dependent variable is the
cost to income ratio. The excluded ownership dummy is Domestic Bank. All models include a constant.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are adjusted for bank clustering with values reported
beneath each coefficient estimate in parenthesis. The dependent variable is Winsorized at 1%. *, ** and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
All banks (657) Survivor banks (495) 5-year Balanced panel (217)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Global MNB -8.987** -7.098* -7.495* -5.967 -6.005 -5.119 -4.825
(3.828) (4.035) (4.295) (4.114) (4.359) (4.771) (4.947)
African MNB 6.111 -0.530 -1.647 0.885 -0.113 -0.996 -0.859
(4.195) (3.598) (3.742) (3.734) (3.886) (4.187) (4.543)
Emerging MNB -7.181 -28.311*** -28.789*** -28.135*** -28.513*** -26.527*** -25.903***
(7.326) (4.726) (5.054) (4.753) (5.067) (5.830) (6.111)
Listed company -16.190*** 0.494 -0.136 1.254 0.730 1.640 1.504
(2.783) (3.206) (3.496) (3.269) (3.578) (3.364) (3.589)
HHI, lagged 2.013 1.605 -4.116 1.575 -8.205 -6.359 -5.643
(8.588) (5.061) (9.638) (5.075) (11.074) (4.599) (5.686)
GDP per capita (host) -0.270*** -0.212 -0.296 0.004
(0.088) (0.220) (0.229) (0.127)
Minimum capital req. (host) -0.156* 0.058 0.064 0.473
(0.086) (0.106) (0.122) (0.378)
Total assets, log, lagged -9.158*** -9.180*** -9.505*** -9.369*** -8.559*** -8.199***
(1.678) (1.982) (1.748) (2.050) (1.905) (2.251)
Market share, lagged -4.201 -8.805 -4.116 -9.926 -2.443 -9.576
(9.730) (14.099) (10.074) (14.489) (10.495) (14.371)
Solvency ratio, lagged -0.139 -0.132 -0.129 -0.113 -0.259 -0.296
(0.229) (0.231) (0.238) (0.239) (0.200) (0.204)
Loan to deposit ratio, lagged -2.048** -2.104** -2.029** -2.126** -1.031* -0.997
(0.833) (0.851) (0.853) (0.867) (0.553) (0.646)
Foreign subs. Africa at inc. 0.981** 0.980** 0.989** 0.998** 0.634 0.571
(0.489) (0.491) (0.492) (0.495) (0.508) (0.535)
Year of entry -0.011 -0.022 -0.009 -0.019 -0.051 -0.052
(0.044) (0.048) (0.045) (0.048) (0.047) (0.050)
Min. capital adequacy ratio (host) 93.700
(116.050)
Prohibition entry via JV (host) 9.648
(6.173)
Prohibition entry via branch (host) 2.924
(5.668)
East Africa -0.623
(5.396)
West Africa 4.194
(5.024)
Central Africa -8.956
(6.236)
Observations 1,921 1,808 1,808 1,754 1,754 875 875
Adjusted R-squared 0.075 0.223 0.213 0.232 0.226 0.259 0.217
Year FE
Host country FE
Year#Host country FE
Wald test, F-Stat
Test Africa-Global 8.86*** 2.76* 1.93 2.91* 1.92 0.62 0.53
Test Africa-Emerging 2.73* 32.25*** 27.73*** 34.89*** 30.19*** 17.51*** 15.47***
Test Global-Emerging 0.05 18.46*** 15.73*** 19.82*** 17.43** 10.87*** 9.72***
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Table 5: Group Support Index - support received by foreign affiliates from their group for
key operational processes
A higher score indicates higher group support to foreign affiliates for operational processes. *** and ** indicates
that the difference in means (t-test) with Global MNB is significant at the 1% level and at the 5% level
respectively.
Support index goes Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
from 0 “none” to 3 “a lot”
African MNB 16 1.80** 0.81 0.2 3
Global MNB 18 2.33 0.47 1 3
Emerging MNB 4 1.40*** 0.43 1 2
All banks 38 2.01 0.7 0.2 3
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Table 6: Interest income vs. interest expenses and bank ownership
This table presents the results of multivariate regression analysis of operating performance for three different
samples (all banks, survivor banks, 5-year balanced panel), using OLS estimation. The dependent variables
are the ratio of interest income to average earning assets, the ratio of interest expenses to average interest
bearing liabilities, non performing loans (NPL) to gross loans and impaired loans to equity (all in %). The
following controls are included in all models: listed company, GDP per capita (host), HHI (t-1), minimum capital
requirements (host), total assets (lagged, in logs), marketshare (lagged), solvency ratio (lagged), loan to deposit
ratio (lagged), number of African subsidiaries owned by the group at incorporation, year of incorporation.
Constants are included but not reported. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are adjusted for
bank clustering with values reported beneath each coefficient estimate in parenthesis. The dependent variables
are Winsorized at 1%. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Interest income Interest expenses NPL Impaired loans
/assets /liabilities /gross loans /equity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All banks (657)
Global MNB -0.917 -0.874*** -2.706** -7.835
(0.802) (0.275) (1.290) (6.031)
African MNB -1.775*** -0.503* -1.597 3.707
(0.556) (0.285) (1.562) (8.056)
Emerging MNB -2.659** -1.052** -3.810 -19.347***
(1.347) (0.521) (2.447) (7.452)
Observations 1,783 1,780 1,088 1,116
Adjusted R-squared 0.458 0.558 0.272 0.269
Controls; Year#Host Country FE
Sample with survivor banks (495)
Global MNB -0.857 -0.817*** -2.166* -6.276
(0.815) (0.278) (1.277) (6.046)
African MNB -1.821*** -0.506* -0.862 5.788
(0.576) (0.299) (1.514) (8.128)
Emerging MNB -2.587* -1.023* -3.396 -16.780**
(1.364) (0.530) (2.419) (7.210)
Observations 1,732 1,729 1,048 1,077
Adjusted R-squared 0.452 0.553 0.273 0.258
Controls; Year#Host Country FE
5-year balanced panel (217)
Global MNB -0.939 -0.885** -1.119 -5.880
(1.059) (0.341) (1.503) (6.407)
African MNB -1.569* -0.593 1.491 5.832
(0.796) (0.359) (1.981) (9.686)
Emerging MNB -2.841 -1.610** -1.471 -14.857**
(2.200) (0.814) (2.832) (6.467)
Observations 860 855 605 617
Adjusted R-squared 0.437 0.637 0.159 0.156
Controls; Year#Host Country FE
Wald test, F-Stat
Test Africa-Global 0.34 0.63 2.79* 2.82*
Test Africa-Emerging 0.37 1.52 0.87 5.00**
Test Global-Emerging 0.80 0.87 0.02 1.83
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Table 7: Banks’ funding profile (in % of total funding)
This table presents the results of multivariate regression analyses of banks’ funding profile for two different
samples (all banks, and 5-year balanced panel), using OLS estimation. Each dependent funding source variable
is in % of total funding. The excluded ownership dummy is Domestic Bank. The following controls are included
in all models: listed company, total assets (lagged, in logs), market share (lagged), solvency ratio (lagged),
loan to deposit ratio (lagged), number of African subsidiaries owned by the group at incorporation, year of
incorporation, GDP per capita (host), HHI (lagged), minimum capital requirements (host), minimum capital
adequacy ratio (host). Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are adjusted for bank clustering with
values reported beneath each coefficient estimate in parenthesis.*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Note: Short-term funding (in % of total funding) (col. 1) is composed of customer deposits (current (2), saving
(3) and term (4)) plus deposits from banks (5) and other short term funding (not reported in the table). Current
accounts, which may or may not be interest bearing, are subject to immediate and unlimited withdrawal at
the option of the customer. Savings accounts place some limitation on the frequency of withdrawals. They
generally pay higher interest than current accounts. Term deposits have a fixed maturity date.
SHORT-TERM Customer Deposits Deposits
FUNDING (% total) current saving term from banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PANEL A: All banks (287)
Global MNB 0.024** 0.107*** -0.107*** -0.042 0.018
(0.011) (0.040) (0.040) (0.038) (0.024)
African MNB 0.009 0.092** -0.137*** 0.007 -0.004
(0.011) (0.038) (0.041) (0.033) (0.024)
Emerging MNB 0.037*** 0.114 -0.097** 0.059 -0.039
(0.014) (0.086) (0.046) (0.061) (0.035)
Observations 1,761 1,501 1,154 1,531 1,322
Adjusted R-squared 0.386 0.219 0.467 0.481 0.084
Controls
Year#Host Country FE
PANEL B: 5-year balanced panel (197)
Global MNB 0.031* 0.147*** -0.136*** -0.038 0.014
(0.018) (0.053) (0.049) (0.047) (0.040)
African MNB 0.012 0.144*** -0.171*** 0.029 -0.000
(0.015) (0.048) (0.054) (0.040) (0.040)
Emerging MNB 0.057** 0.201* -0.117* 0.109 -0.063
(0.026) (0.116) (0.060) (0.087) (0.048)
Observations 797 723 547 720 620
Adjusted R-squared 0.430 0.121 0.478 0.408 0.073
Controls
Year#Host Country FE
Wald test, F-Stat
Test Africa-Global 2.42 0.00 0.89 2.63 0.20
Test Africa-Emerging 3.46* 0.25 1.65 0.87 2.93*
Test Global-Emerging 1.49 0.23 0.19 2.74* 4.94**
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Table 8: Access to customers’ deposits
The index is the average of the respondents’ perception of their bank’s access to customers’ deposit for each
category of banks. The index goes from -3 “Very difficult access” to + 3 “Very easy access”. *** indicates that
the difference in means (t-test) with domestic bank is significant at the 1% level.
Number of banks Index of ease of access to customers’ deposit
(from -3 “Very Difficult” to +3 “Very Easy”)
Global MNB 19 1.89***
Regional African MNB 17 0.47
Domestic banks 36 0.25
Emerging MNB 5 1.58
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Figure 1: Components of the Group Support Index by categories of banks (unweighted)
0 1 2 3
Global MNB
Emerging MNB
African MNB
Marketing IT systems
Operational risk Credit risk Mgt
Lending tech. Overall measure
Source: Proprietary Bank Survey data
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Table A.2: Evolution of the composition of the banking sector over the sample period
2003-2012
Number of banks by country of origin (number and percentage of total)
Number of banks per year per category
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Domestic bank 210 197 190 190 195 197 203 200 199 198
Global MNB 87 88 87 87 90 91 92 92 92 92
Emerging MNB 20 22 24 24 25 26 26 27 28 28
African MNB 94 107 114 114 123 132 148 164 169 173
Total 411 414 415 415 433 446 469 483 488 491
% of banks per year per category
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Domestic bank 51.1 47.6 45.8 45.8 45.0 44.2 43.3 41.4 40.8 40.3
Global MNB 21.2 21.3 21.0 21.0 20.8 20.4 19.6 19.1 18.9 18.7
Emerging MNB 4.9 5.3 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.7
African MNB 22.9 25.9 27.5 27.5 28.4 29.6 31.6 34.0 34.6 35.2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Author calculations based on BankScope database
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Table A.3: Summary statistics for banks’ financial variables by category of bank
Variable Obs. Mean Std Dev. 25% Median 75%
Global Banks
ROE 546 28.89 26.64 16.55 28.68 40.85
Cost income Ratio 532 61.68 32.66 45.35 56.90 71.37
Interest income/avg earning assets 482 11.38 7.19 7.95 10.16 13.18
Interest expenses/avg int bearing liabilities 477 3.30 2.19 1.78 2.84 4.33
Non-Performing Loans to Gross Loans 315 6.36 6.35 1.83 4.39 8.58
Impaired loans to equity 318 32.99 36.40 8.25 21.74 45.43
Total Assets (US$ mns) 553 2951.15 12600.00 169.38 408.18 886.92
Market share 553 0.17 0.17 0.06 0.14 0.23
Solvency ratio 546 11.80 7.51 7.82 10.11 13.31
Loan to deposit ratio 551 0.57 0.24 0.39 0.57 0.75
Year incorporation 543 1968.39 35.88 1959.00 1978.00 1997.00
Government ownership 553 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00
Listed 553 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00
African MNB
ROE 828 8.68 58.49 2.86 18.56 33.15
Cost income Ratio 802 85.49 89.55 53.43 64.50 84.12
Interest income/avg earning assets 717 10.68 4.67 7.43 9.83 12.83
Interest expenses/avg int bearing liabilities 719 3.71 2.56 1.90 3.17 4.87
Non-Performing Loans to Gross Loans 432 8.10 9.99 1.63 5.16 10.49
Impaired loans to equity 458 43.81 68.84 6.62 22.81 53.96
Total Assets (US$ mns) 836 295.57 477.10 56.06 131.54 338.91
Market share 836 0.17 0.22 0.03 0.09 0.22
Solvency ratio 836 12.95 11.90 7.25 10.05 14.53
Loan to deposit ratio 827 0.59 0.25 0.44 0.60 0.72
Year incorporation 823 1991.57 21.48 1988.00 1998.00 2004.00
Government ownership 836 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
Listed 836 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Summary statistics (continued)
Variable Obs. Mean Std Dev. 25% Median 75%
Domestic Banks
ROE 1109 19.23 24.92 8.91 19.21 30.25
Cost income Ratio 1078 66.26 39.54 49.07 60.89 75.47
Interest income/avg earning assets 977 13.28 15.05 7.94 10.87 14.52
Interest expenses/avg int bearing liabilities 975 5.20 6.94 2.37 4.02 6.22
Non-Performing Loans to Gross Loans 624 11.32 14.03 2.49 5.99 14.57
Impaired loans to equity 637 39.77 90.10 8.70 21.69 48.13
Total Assets (US$ mns) 1129 2325.21 10500.00 92.37 231.57 797.91
Market share 1129 0.13 0.17 0.01 0.06 0.19
Solvency ratio 1129 16.17 16.18 8.93 12.41 18.00
Loan to deposit ratio 1099 0.95 2.97 0.46 0.62 0.78
Year incorporation 1121 1980.22 27.83 1971.00 1989.00 1996.00
Government ownership 1129 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00
Listed 1129 0.22 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00
Emerging MNB
ROE 131 17.30 14.70 8.16 15.55 29.38
Cost income Ratio 130 63.26 35.15 41.74 61.72 76.40
Interest income/avg earning assets 112 10.86 5.49 7.48 10.93 13.66
Interest expenses/avg int bearing liabilities 109 4.40 2.61 2.43 4.52 6.04
Non-Performing Loans to Gross Loans 60 5.03 7.26 0.39 3.29 4.94
Impaired loans to equity 60 11.37 13.79 1.80 8.42 15.32
Total Assets (US$ mns) 131 267.44 633.69 49.78 105.87 210.96
Market share 131 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03
Solvency ratio 131 20.53 20.02 10.19 13.87 20.16
Loan to deposit ratio 122 0.44 0.23 0.30 0.41 0.55
Year incorporation 124 1978.19 30.04 1967.00 1989.00 1996.50
Government ownership 131 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
Listed 131 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Figure A.1: Banks’ entry by year
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Source: BankScope database and banks’ websites.
Note: Banks’ incorporation date for banks active during the period 2003-2012. Information available for 609
banks out of 657.
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Appendix B
The development of the survey questionnaire was done in several steps. The questionnaire
was first developed through literature review and theory development. It was subsequently
reviewed by academicians with specific experience in the topic of multinational banking or in
firm survey methodology. I then proceeded to the pretesting of the questionnaire through face-
to-face interviews with three managers of a foreign affiliate of an emerging multinational bank
in London to clarify the phenomenon of interest and identify any relevant issue not addressed
in the preliminary questionnaire.
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